In the six games of the 2022 NBA Finals, here was what the Golden State Warriors half court offense managed per 100 possessions: 90.1, 109.4, 94.8, 83.9, 95.2, and 83.1 points. By way of reference, the Cleveland Cavaliers’ 20th ranked half-court offense put up an offensive rating of 94.2 in the regular season per Cleaning the Glass. Golden State’s 83.1 half-court rating in the clinching game was 5.5 points behind Detroit’s league-worst mark.
So first, credit the Boston Celtics defense. Ime Udoka’s team was one of the finest defensive units in recent memory. The Warriors had to scrounge whatever points they could find. Game 6 was a microcosm of how they managed to outscore the Celtics, equal parts beauty, brute force, and beast.
Beauty
But do aesthetics matter? Should beauty be a quest in basketball?
Jerry West, a Hall of Fame player for the Lakers who, as a team executive, built decades of championship rosters, is now a consultant to the Warriors.
“Aesthetics absolutely matter,” West said. “They matter because it usually means you’re more proficient in what you’re doing.”
In other words, these days, playing pretty is playing to win.
That’s from a 2016 John Branch story on the Golden State Warriors’ beautiful offensive game. All cuts, passes, and motion, it has always been reminiscent of teams like the “summertime” Spurs, with an extra dollop of flair. That offense peeked through at times in this series. Two Klay Thompson buckets during the second quarter stood out to me. The first is vintage Warriors, featuring the Hall of Fame trio of Draymond Green, Steph Curry, and Klay Thompson. This could well have been the Warriors’ signature split action, just with Draymond at the top of the arc instead of in the post. Klay shapes up to screen for Steph, but slips the screen and cuts to the basket. The Celtics defense is adept at switching on screens; one of the best ways to beat a switch is with a slip and this play demonstrates why. Grant Williams gets caught on Klay’s back, mis-timing the switch. Of course, it doesn’t matter if Draymond doesn’t thread the needle with a tougher-than-it-looks pass.
The Warriors do run their traditional split action the next play down, with Gary Payton II entering the ball to Andrew Wiggins before pivoting into a screen for Steph. Boston defends it well, with Jayson Tatum fighting over the screen and Robert Williams III dropping back. Williams is comfortable doing that against the acceptable perimeter shooting threat of GPII. Golden State immediately moves to the next action, a GPII screen for Klay at the top of the arc. With Williams still in a deep drop, GPII just needs to slow Jaylen Brown enough to give Klay the window he needs for his lightning release. Again, vintage Warriors.
Such plays proved more the exception than the rule in this series; Boston had the tools, the smarts, and the scheme to gum up the Warriors’ motion offense. For Golden State to win the series and the game, they needed to get into the muck.
Brute Force
The Warriors and the Celtics had the NBA’s top two defenses and it showed in the Finals score lines. That the Warriors came out on top probably comes down to the fact that they had the most potent offensive weapon, the finals MVP. Reflecting after Games 1 and 2, I noted that the Steph high pick and roll was a cheat code that the Warriors had at their luxury when Boston snuffed out their pet motion sets. That came to the fore in Steph’s Game 4 magnum opus; the broader point was that Steph remains a potent isolation scorer. Towards the end of Game 6, Steph put the Celtics to bed by getting Al Horford switched out onto him on the perimeter. Much to the bafflement of Jeff Van Gundy and Mark Jackson on commentary, Boston gave up a number of easy switches. The results went about as expected:
Steph averaged 1.2 points per isolation possession this season (1.13 in the playoffs). Al Horford deserved better.
Steph’s Game 6 shot chart is a thing of a beauty, all paint shots and threes. This is an all-time great knowing exactly where and when to pick his spots:
The Beast
Steph notwithstanding, Golden State does not come out on top if Boston does not turn the ball over 22 times in Game 6. Some were of the drive-into-bodies-without-a-plan sort that Ime Udoka especially regretted coming out of Game 5.
To paint the turnovers as purely unforced errors does the Golden State defense a disservice. The Warriors forced a number of live ball turnovers, limiting Boston’s offense and fueling Golden State’s transition game (“death from above” as Zach Lowe has called it).
As in Game 4, the Warriors’ defended well as a team, locking in their rotations. Watch as Andrew Wiggins quickly recovers back onto Jayson Tatum to save Jordan Poole from the switch here. At the same time, Klay Thompson recognizes that he needs to help on Grant Williams’ roll and does not follow Al Horford’s cut to the weak side, but is already closing out on Horford as Tatum releases the pass. Meanwhile, Steph Curry hurries to help on Williams, but checks his run in anticipation of Horford’s drive. Although the steal is credited to Draymond Green, the Warriors force it as a team.
Speaking of Draymond, Game 6 was a masterpiece. Despite enduring a couple of tough games earlier in the series, Draymond was central to Golden State’s clinching victory. His rotations were timed perfectly all through the game:
Draymond is one of the smartest defenders to have played in the NBA. Watch his anticipation here; he is keying the Warriors’ fast break almost as soon as Tatum drives the baseline:
Or how about his knowledge of the scouting report, recognizing that Jaylen Brown is likely to spin towards his right after being forced left here:
Draymond had 8 deflections and 2 steals in Game 6, allowing the Warriors to add 5 points per 100 in transition per CTG. Hang this performance in the Louvre.
Thank you for following From the Logo through this NBA season. I might have a retrospective piece on the Warriors’ playoff run at some point, but that about wraps up the 2021-2022 season.